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The rising indebtedness of the U.S. business sector 
raises some  issues for  macroeconomic stabilization 
policy.1 Recent studies have investigated whether this 
rise in corporate leverage has increased the  risk of 
bankruptcies or liquidations  in economic downturns.2 
This article presents evidence that  increases in 
leverage at the firm level are associated with increased 
volatility  in  capital expenditures and employment 
growth rates. Such a relationship implies that an 
increase in the average level of indebtedness across 
firms may cause the economy to become more vulner- 
able to macroeconomic shocks and more sensitive to 
changes in monetary policy. 
The  potential effects of leverage are assessed in this 
article by comparing investment and employment pat- 
terns of firms with different average levels of indebted- 
ness. The highly leveraged firms are shown to have 
experienced  greater than average volatility in their 
1For documentation  of the recent rise in corporate leverage,  see Ben 
Bernanke and John Campbell. "Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?" 
Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1988,  pp. 83-125: and 
Richard Kopke, "The Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing 
Corporate Investments,"  New England Economic Review, July-August 
1989, pp. 25-48. For a discussion of the potential effects of leverage 
on macroeconomic  stability and  monetary  policy  transmission, see 
Benjamin Friedman, "Implications of  Corporate Indebtedness for 
Monetary Policy,"  unpublished paper,  Harvard University,  September 
1989: and William Lee, "Corporate Leverage and the Consequences 
of  Macroeconomic  Instability," in Studies on Financial Changes and 
the Transmission of  Monetary  Policy. Federal Reserve  Bank of New 
York, 1990, pp. 135-68. 
2See, for example.  Bernanke and Campbell, "Is  There a Corporate 
Debt Crisis?" and David Wyss, Christopher Probyn,  and Robert de 
Angelis, "The Impact of Recession  on High Yield Bonds," Alliance for 
Capital Access, Washington,  D.C., July 1989, mimeo. 
expenditures  on plant, equipment,  and labor. Even after 
controlling for a variety of other firm characteristics, the 
empirical analysis shows a positive statistical relation- 
ship between leverage and volatility  in investment and 
employment. 
The analysis  also suggests  an explanation for the 
greater average volatility of highly  leveraged firms: a 
heightened  sensitivity to fluctuations in cash flow. 
Because these firms typically face  substantial  debt 
service obligations and have limited ability to borrow 
additional funds, they may feel extra pressure to main- 
tain a positive  cash flow cushion. Thus they will be 
more likely  than their  less leveraged counterparts to 
respond to changes in cost and demand by sharply 
adjusting their input expenditures. Most notably, when 
sales drop off, even temporarily, highly leveraged firms 
may  choose to postpone investment  or to lay off 
workers until demand strengthens.3 
The empirical  methodology used in  this article to 
relate  leverage to cash flow sensitivities follows that 
employed in a recent study by Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen.4 These authors show that small, fast-growing 
firms with  low  dividend-payout  rates  tend to have 
heightened correlations between their investment rates 
3Bernanke  and Campbell state that "the way financial distress distorts 
decisions may depend on how close to bankruptcy a firm is. The 
managers of a firm that is doing poorly but  is not in immediate 
danger may become conservative,,  .to avoid potentially fatal 
mistakes....  Once bankruptcy becomes likely, on the other hand, 
gambling becomes a  better strategy for the managers." 
4Steven Fazzari,  R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen,  "Financing 
Constraints  and Corporate Investment,"  Brookings Papers  on 
Economic  Activity, 1:1988. pp.  141  -95. 
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leveraged firms examined here are also shown to have 
investment rates with sharp sensitivities to fluctuations 
in sales and cash  flow. Thus the methodology produces 
similar results in the two studies although the sample 
of leveraged  firms in this analysis is more  heavily 
weighted toward larger and less rapidly growing com- 
panies. This article also extends  its analysis to the 
relationship between  cash flow and employment,  a 
topic not covered in the earlier  study. 
Background 
Over the years, economists have shifted their assess- 
ment of the effects of cash flows or internally gener- 
ated funds on firms' capital expenditures. It was 
traditionally believed that cash flow was important for 
firms' investment  decisions because  firm managers 
regarded internal funds as less expensive than exter- 
nal funds. In the 1950s and  1960s, this view led to 
numerous empirical assessments of the role of internal 
funds in firm investment  behavior.5  These studies found 
strong relationships between cash flow and investment. 
However,  because sales, output, and cash  flow have 
historically been highly correlated in  aggregate data, 
these studies could not isolate the variable that was 
actually driving investment. Thus the results obtained 
may also have been consistent with theories of invest- 
ment that deemphasize internal funds. 
The literature's emphasis on the interaction of real 
and financial variables declined after a theoretical 
paper by Modigliani and Miller showed that, under cer- 
tain theoretical conditions (perfect capital markets, no 
taxes, and no bankruptcy), the market would not con- 
sider a firm's capital structure when valuing its assets.6 
By implication, the marginal cost of equity, debt,  and 
internal funds financing would then be equal, and finan- 
cial  policy would be irrelevant to investment and 
employment decisions.  If a firm's internal  funds 
exceeded its real investment needs, this free cash  flow 
would be either  returned directly to stockholders 
through dividends  or stock buybacks or invested for 
them by acquiring income-earning assets. 
The theoretical case for the independence of real 
and financial decisions was reinforced when Jorgenson 
presented empirical evidence that aggregate cash flow 
or profits variables provided no additional explanatory 
5See, for example, the  joint work of Edwin Kuh and John Meyer,  The 
Investment  Decision (Cambridge: Harvard University  Press,  1957); 
and "Investment, Liquidity and Monetary Policy," in Commission  on 
Money and Credit: Impacts of  Monetary Policy (Englewood  Cliffs, 
N.J.:  Prentice Hall, 1963). 
°Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, The Cost of  Capital, Corporate 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment,"  American Economic Review, 
vol. 48 (June 1958),  pp. 261  -97. 
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power for aggregate investment regressions if sales or 
output variables were included in  the equations.7 
Models that denied a role to internal funds therefore 
dominated the investment literature until recently, 
largely because of their theoretical appeal. 
Newly developed formal models, however,  challenge 
the assumptions  underlying the so-called  Modigliani- 
Miller theorem and argue that a firm's investment and 
employment decisions do depend on the availability of 
internal finance. The theoretical arguments supporting 
these models generally describe how the existence of 
informational asymmetries between firm managers and 
lenders can raise the cost of external funds over the 
cost of internal funds.8 The main argument is that 
because managers can only be imperfectly monitored 
by investors, lenders will require a higher rate of return 
to be compensated for the possibility that the manager 
is  wasting resources.  The increased  availability of inter- 
nally generated funds  lowers the cost of capital  and 
thus affects real economic decisions by inducing more 
investment than would occur if managers had to seek 
external finance. Internally generated funds are there- 
fore  cheaper at the margin than external funding. It fol- 
lows that firms with plenty of internally generated cash 
may tend to invest more, other factors equal. 
This argument has implications for the  relative 
responsiveness of different types of firms to fluctua- 
tions in their cash flows. A firm with a large average 
cash flow typically accumulates a substantial reserve 
of internal funds that  can be drawn upon to maintain an 
investment program when cash flow drops off in a par- 
ticular  year. By contrast, a highly leveraged firm with a 
small average cash flow does not have such a reserve 
and may  need to cut investments back sharply in 
response to a decline in cash flow. When revenues and 
internal funds pick up, the leveraged firm is more apt to 
increase its capital expenditures. Overall, the leveraged 
firm is  therefore likely to exhibit greater variability in its 
investments over time. 
The recent availability of quality  historical data on 
individual firms and the increasing popularity of these 
asymmetric-information  models of the firm's capital 
structure have renewed interest in the empirical esti- 
mation of the interaction between financial  variables 
and firm  investment.9 Articles  exploring this relation- 
7Dale Jorgenson,  "Econometric Studies of Investment  Behavior," 
Journal of  Economic Literature, vol. 9 (1971), pp. 1111-47. 
6lhis recent literature is suryeyed by Mark Gertler and R. Glenn 
Hubbard, "Financial Factors in Business  Fluctuations," in Financial 
Market Volatility,  Federal Reserve  Bank of Kansas City, 1988. 
9An article by  Steven Fazzari and Michael Athey, "Asymmetric 
Information, Financing Constraints  and Investment," Review  of 
Economics and Statistics, August 1989, pp. 481-87,  uses Compustat 
data to show  that if  one adds internal finance (after-tax profits plus ship confirm  that fluctuations in  internal funds are 
important determinants of investment. 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen show that internal 
funds are more important for explaining the investment 
of certain  cash-constrained firms (specifically, those 
that have low average dividend-payout rates) than the 
investment of other firms. In the authors' data  set, 
these firms are smaller, faster growing, and more sub- 
ject to sales  volatility than  the rest of the sample. 
These characteristics, combined with the firms' practice 
of using most of their earnings for investment, make 
the firms more likely to face a large differential cost 
between internal and external funds. The novelty of the 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen approach lies in dem- 
onstrating that the behavior of certain classes of firms 
depends on capital market imperfections and the avail- 
ability of internal funds while other firms behave as if 
they face relatively perfect capital markets.'° 
The analysis that follows uses the logic and meth- 
odology of  the Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen study to 
investigate whether highly leveraged firms—firms that 
are cash-constrained because of debt service obliga- 
Footnote  9 continued 
depreciation less dividends) and interest expense variables to a 
sales accelerator model with fixed  firm effects, internal finance is 
positively, and interest expense negatively,  related to investment. 
Using Value Line data and somewhat  different econometric 
techniques, Steven Fazzari  and Tracy Mott ("The Investment  Theories 
of Kalecki and Keynes:  An Empirical Study of Firm Data, 1970-1982," 
Journal of  Post Keynesian  Economics,  Winter 1987-88,  pp. 171-87) 
show that these financial variables are also important in CAPM-based 
models, neoclassical models of investment,  and sales accelerator 
models. 
10A related article by Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap,  and David 
Scharfslein, "Corporate  Structure, Liquidity and Investment: Evidence 
from Japanese Industrial Groups," Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 
vol. 109 (September  1988),  identifies a group of  Japanese firms that 
face relatively small differentials between their costs of internal and 
external finance because they have close ties to  individual banks. 
The authors find that firms without such relationships  alter their 
capital expenditures  much more in response to  cash flow and liquid 
asset fluctuations  than do those firms with special banking 
relationships. 
In an unpublished paper,  "Debt, Liquidity Constraints,  and 
Corporate  Investment: Evidence from Panel Data," Princeton 
University,  1989, Toni Whited adopts an Euler equation estimation 
approach and shows that for  most firms the neoclassical model is 
not rejected by the Compustat  data  while for firms that are classified 
a priori as experiencing "financial distress," the model needs to  be 
amended to incorporate a potentially binding financing constraint. 
The financially constrained or distressed firms, like the low  dividend- 
payout firms identified by Fazzari,  Hubbard. and Petersen,  are 
smaller and faster growing than the rest of  the sample. 
These three papers do not reveal, however,  whether  firms that have 
increased their leverage in recenl years are likely to change their 
behavior as a result of their restructuring. Many of the recent 
leveraged buyouts have involved large, mature firms in noncyclical, 
stable industries such as medical services, retailing, and 
entertainment.  Fazzari,  Hubbard, and Petersen  did not report the 
leverage ratios of their low dividend-payout  firms, but the recent 
leveraged buyouts have typically involved firms that have very 
different characteristics than the low dividend-payout  firms examined 
by  these authors. 
tions—exhibit increased sensitivity to cash flow. These 
firms, like the small,  rapidly growing firms studied by 
Fazzari and  his colleagues, are  likely to face  higher 
borrowing costs than less leveraged firms. In addition, 
the analysis tests whether leveraged firms have height- 
ened sensitivities to current demand conditions when 
cash flow is  held  constant.  Particularly when high 
leverage encourages a risk-averse attitude on the part 
of management, a drop in current sales may lead firms 
to postpone investment and strenuously avoid inven- 
tory buildup, even if they are experiencing offsetting 
improvements in interest or other  expenses. Since the 
maintenance  of employment  in  a downturn can be 
viewed as an investment by firms, these effects may 
also  be present  in the employment patterns  of 
leveraged firms. In sum, the statistical analysis  pre- 
sented  below  is designed  to assess  the effect of 
leverage on overall cyclical variability by studying the 
interaction of financial and real variables for both firm 
employment and investment in plant and equipment. 
Characteristics  of the  data 
The basic data source for this article is the Compustat 
annual financial data tapes, which contain information 
on firms between 1968 and 1987.11 Only 778 nonfinan- 
cial firms have complete data sets for all variables 
(including  necessary  lags) used  in this study. Firms 
that had large acquisitions over this period were elimi- 
nated  from the sample  because the statistical  pro- 
cedures (the model's lag structure and the estimation 
of the fixed firm effects) employed in the study required 
that  the general characteristics of the firms be constant 
over time.'2 
Of the remaining 586 firms, a surprisingly large 
number, 176, had lower sales revenue (in 1982 dollars) 
in 1987 than in 1971. These negative-growth firms were 
not dropped  from the sample (as they were in the 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen analysis) because this 
study is  particularly concerned with the ways in which 
firms respond to adverse shocks. Nevertheless, many 
of the regressions reported below for the sample of 
586 firms were also run on a sample limited to the 410 
firms that showed  positive growth,.and the results 
liThe general quality of the Compustat  data and its merits relative to 
the Value Line data have been discussed in an unpublished paper 
by Terry Zivney and Richard Marcus, "A Comparative,  Analysis of 
Compustat and Value  Line  Financial  Data Tapes," University of 
Tennessee.  February 1989. 
'2Firms were dropped if they had a  capital stock acquisition in one 
year exceeding 15 percent of their existing capital stock. Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen  used a slightly different rule, eliminating  firms 
that had asset acquisitions exceeding 10 percent of existing assets. 
Whited, in "Debt. Liquidity Constraints,  and Corporate Investment," 
eliminated firms that had asset acquisitions exceeding 15 percent of 
existing assets. Various rules were tried and appeared to have little 
effect on the main results of this paper. 
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The definition of cash flow used in this paper is net 
income (earnings after interest and taxes) plus depre- 
ciation and amortization.14 Investment is defined  as 
capital expenditures other  than those obtained through 
acquisitions  of other firms. Compustat's employment 
data are usually measured at the end of the year, but 
some firms may report  midyear or year-average data. 
The  rest of  the data are reported on a fiscal-year basis; 
the median reporting date among firms  is December 
31, but there is wide dispersion. 
The market value of the end-of-year capital stock is 
calculated in the same manner as in Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and  Petersen.  Physical  depreciation  rates  are  esti- 
mated for each firm from its reported depreciation and 
gross book value of capital. As a benchmark starting 
value, the reported book value of the net capital stock 
is assumed to be an accurate measure of the market 
value of the stock in 1968. Subsequent capital stocks 
are calculated by adding capital expenditures (invest- 
ment and net capital  acquisitions),  subtracting  esti- 
mated physical depreciation, and adjusting the total by 
changes in the aggregate price of capital goods.15 
Summary statistics describing the more and less 
leveraged  firms 
The 586 firms are split into two groups according to 
their average degree of leverage over the sample. 
Associated with each firm is a single debt-to-asset ratio 
that equals its median book value debt-to-asset ratio 
over the seventeen years between 1971 and 1987. The 
firms are  ranked on the basis of this ratio: the most 
leveraged  20 percent, 118 firms, are  placed  in the 
highly leveraged "group H," and the remaining 80 per- 
cent, 456 firms, are  assigned to the less leveraged 
"group L."16 Other  methods of splitting the sample 
were considered, and  one method based on interest 
coverage ratios is discussed  below, but this article 
13A noticeable difference did occur when the sample was split, as in 
Fazzari,  Hubbard, and Petersen,  into  two groups: firms with low 
dividend-payout  rates and firms with high dividend-payout  rates. In 
the sample of 410 firms,  the high retention rate firms are, on average, 
smaller and faster growing than other firms, and their investment 
rates are more sensitive to  cash  flow variations.  The firms in the high- 
leverage  group do fbI have  higher than average retention rates. 
'4Some experimentation  suggested that the results presented here are 
not sensitive to modifications  of Ihe  definition of cash flow  —  such as 
excluding preferred or ordinary dividends or including taxes. 
15unlike other authors,  I add to the previous year's capital stock the 
physical capital obtained through acquisilions of other firms. 
1Firms  ranked in Ihe "lop 20 percent  by  their dividend-payout  ratios 
were also singled oul for study by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 
but this percentage is essentially an arbitrary cutoff point. The effect 
of splitling Ihe  top 20 percent into the top 10 percent and the next 
10 percent is discussed below. 
focuses primarily on the book-value debt-to-asset ratio 
grouping.17 
Table 1  shows that the firms' debt-to-asset  ratios 
range between 0.32 and 0.69 for group H and between 
0.00 and 0.32 for group L. Splitting the sample  into 
groups on a year-by-year basis would  lead to some 
switching of firms  in and  out of the two groups, but 
17The debt-to-asset  ratio is intended to measure a  firm's capacity to 
respond to investment  opportunities and its ability to absorb shocks. 
The choice of book value over market  value is somewhat  arbitrary, 
but it is based in part  on the relative ease of the former's  calculation. 
Market  value and book value measures  of  debts  and assets may not 
accurately reflect a liquidation value or capacity to borrow.  Bernanke 
and Campbell, "Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?" and Kopke, "The 
Role of Debt and Liquidity," compare trends in book value debt 10 
market  value debt for Compustat  firms. 
Group H  Group L 
Number of  firms  118  468 
Median debt/asset ratio  —  highest in group  0.69  0.32 
Median debt/asset ralio — lowest in group  0.32  0.00 
Median Values in Each Group 
Median debt-to-asset ratio  0.39  0.20 
Debt-to-asset  ratio in 1971  0.40  0.21 
Debt-to-asset  ratio in 1987  0.38  0.21 
Assets in 1971 (in millions of 1982 dollars)  262  263 
Assets in 1987 (in millions of 1982 dollars)  371  481 
Median cash tlowt—to—interest coverage  2.95  6.84 
•Mean annual real sales growth rates  0.033  0.035 
Mean annual employment  growth rates  0.008  0.011 
Mean annual investment-to-capital  ratios  0.13  0.14 
Mean annual real cash flows 
(in millions of 1982 dollars)  21.2  37.3 
Standard deviations of 
annual investment-to-capital  ratios  0.095  0.071 
Standard  deviations of 
annual employment  growth rates  0.142  0.114 
Standard  deviations of 
real sales growth rates  0.153  0.122 
Standard  deviations of 
annual real cash flows 
(in millions 011982 dollars)  15.4  15.4 
Mean Values in Each Group 
Table  1 
Sample Statistics for the Highly Leveraged 
(Group  H) and Less Leveraged (Group  L) 
Firms 
(Median, Means, and Standard  Deviations Calculated for 
Individual Firms over Seventeen  Years: 1971-87) 
Standard deviations of 
annual investment-to-capital  ratios 
Standard deviations of 
mean employment  growth rates 
34  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990 
0,126  0.085 
0.191  0.136 
tCash flow = net income + interest expense + depreciation 
+ amortization. 
jCash flow = net income + depreciation + amortization. overall  the relative indebtedness of the firms in the two 
groups is fairly stable. The median debt-to-asset ratio 
of group H firms is almost twice that of group L  firms  in 
both 1971 and 1987. 
This median debt-to-asset ratio is a "stock" measure 
of leverage, but it has a natural "flow" counterpart, the 
firm's median cash flow—to—interest  coverage ratio over 
the 1971  to 1987 period. The average values  of this 
ratio among firms in groups H and L are 2.95 and 6.84, 
respectively,  indicating that the group H firms are more 
highly leveraged in  this flow sense as well.'8 These 
measures  also indicate, however, that the differences in 
leverage are moderate compared to the debt-to-asset 
and interest-coverage ratios of many of the firms that 
underwent financial  restructurings through  leveraged 
buyouts in 1980s.'9 
The typical firms of groups H  and L are similar in 
asset size. The average group H firm had assets (in 
current dollars) in 1971 and 1987 of about $262 million 
and $371  million, respectively, and the corresponding 
group L averages were $263 million and $481  million. 
In line with their somewhat faster  asset growth,  the 
group L firms had slightly  higher sales growth, employ- 
ment growth, and investment rates. The group H firms 
had significantly lower average cash flow (net income 
plus depreciation  and amortization),  a finding which 
reflects their higher leverage. 
The most  interesting difference between the two 
groups for the purposes of this study  is that the highly 
leveraged firms experienced  more volatility (that is, 
greater seventeen-year  standard deviations)  in  their 
investment and  employment rates.  These firms also 
had higher sales volatility, because of more variable 
demand and/or more variable production.20 The two 
groups experienced similar volatility  in their  cash  flows. 
Differences in leverage for this sample, therefore, can- 
not readily be explained  or justified by arguing that 
firms with less volatile cash flows or  revenues can 
"afford"  higher leverage without increased  risk of 
bankruptcy. 
These  summary statistics are consistent with the 
view that highly leveraged firms experience greater vol- 
atility, both in sales and input expenditures. The  follow- 
ing two sections study reduced form relationships that 
leFor the calculation of  this particular ratio, interest expenses are 
included (added back) to cash flow. Of the 118 firms that make up 
the  top 20 percent of  firms with respect to their debt-to-asset ratios, 
79 are among the 118 firms that make up the bottom 20 percent with 
respect to interest coverage. 
'°The Compustat  database excludes firms that are not publicly traded, 
such as  those that have  become  highly indebted as a result of 
leveraged buyouls. 
20lnput cost variations might induce production changes even if the 
demand curve facing the  firm were constant. 
may clarify the source of these different characteristics. 
Since the group H firms were neither particularly small 
nor rapidly growing, the results of this study may be 
relevant for understanding the impact of the recent 
trend toward increased leverage among large, mature 
firms. 
Explaining differences in investment and employ- 
ment volatilities across firms 
This section provides evidence that the differences in 
investment and employment volatilities may in fact be 
due to differences in leverage rather than firm-specific 
or industry characteristics that happen'to be correlated 
with leverage. The regressions presented attempt to 
explain the differences  across firms with respect to 
their investment rate (investment divided by the prior 
year-end capital  stock)  and employment growth rate 
volatilities, where volatilities are measured by standard 
deviations calculated over seventeen years. 
Table 2 displays the main  results. The dependent 
variables in the two regressions are cross sections of 
the standard deviations of firms' investment rates and 
employment growth  rates. Some industries may have 
systematically higher leverage  ratios21  and  greater 
investment and employment volatilities. All cross-sec- 
tional  regressions therefore include industry dummies 
(coefficient estimates not reported) to ensure that the 
measured correlation between leverage and volatility  is 
not simply capturing special industry effects.22 
Because previous studies have shown that small and 
rapidly growing firms tend to experience greater vol- 
atility, variables for growth and  size are  included as 
controls  in all the  regressions  as well.  Firm  size  is 
measured by the dollar value of assets in 1979, the 
midpoint of the sample. The estimated coefficient on 
firm size is indeed negative, as expected, and statis- 
tically significant. Firm growth is measured by average 
investment and average employment growth rates  in 
the investment and employment volatility regressions, 
respectively. The estimated coefficient  is positive, as 
expected, and statistically highly significant. 
Sales  and  cash flow volatility measures are also 
included in the regressions to control for variability of 
demand,  input costs,  and  interest payments facing 
each firm. The  explanatory variables used are the stan- 
dard deviations of each firm's real sales and real cash 
The  determinants of differences in leverage across industries are 
discussed by Robert Bowen,  Lane Daley, and Charles Huber in 
Evidence on the Existence  and Determinants  of Inter-Industry 
Differences  in Leverage."  Financial Management,  Winter 1982. 
pp. 10-20. 
lndustries  were classified at the two-digit standard industry 
classification level. The dummies were always  significant as a  group; 
however,  dropping them had little effect on the other estimated 
coefficients. 
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ment regressions and divided by the number of 
employees in the employment regressions).  As 
expected, these two variables have positive coefficient 
estimates in both sets of regressions. Firm investment 
and employment volatilities appear  somewhat more 
correlated with the variability of sales than with the 
variability of cash flow. 
The most important  regression results concern the 
estimated coefficients  on the so-called dummy vari- 
ables. These variables allow for marginal,  constant- 
term effects on volatility for members of group H. The 
estimated coefficients on the dummy variables meas- 
ure the extent to which volatility differences  across 
firms are explained  by the leverage grouping  alone 
Table 2 
The Marginal  Effects of Leverage on 
Investment and Employment  Volatilities: 
Basic Regressions 
Dependent Variables 
Volatility  of  Volatility  of 
Firms Investment  Firms' Employment 
Rates  Growth Rates 
Firm size  —1.543  —2.442 
(2.2)  (2.2) 












—  0.000 
(0.2) 
rather than  industry- or firm-specific differences cap- 
tured by the other included variables. 
The estimate of the marginal group H effect in the 
investment volatility  regression is 0.033 —  not very dif- 
ferent from the difference (0.041) between the mean 
standard deviations of investment rates for groups H 
and L, shown in Table 1. This finding suggests that the 
difference in average investment volatility is not due to 
special industry factors,  differences in firm growth 
rates, or differences in firm sizes. 
Similar results hold for the employment  volatility 
regression. The  estimate of the marginal group H effect 
in the first employment volatility regression is 0.058  — 
very similar to the difference (0.055)  between the 
mean standard deviations of employment growth rates 
for groups H and L shown in Table 1. This suggests 
that the difference in employment  volatilities across the 
two groups is not due to special industry factors, differ- 
ences in firm growth rates, or differences in firm sizes. 
Table 3 presents regressions that probe somewhat 
deeper into the ways in which higher leverage may 
lead to greater volatility. To the basic investment and 
employment  volatility specifications in Table 2, the 
regressions in  Table 3 add marginal sales and cash 
flow volatility effects. These specifications  allow the 
coefficients on the sales and cash volatility  variables to 
vary between group H firms and the rest of sample. 
For example, the left-most columns of Tables 2 and 3 
report  specifications that are identical except for the 
inclusion of the "group H sales volatility"  dummy vari- 
able in the Table 3 regression. This variable consists of 
sales volatilities for group H firms and zeros for group 
L firms,23  The effect of sales volatility on  investment 
volatility for group L firms is measured simply by the 
sales volatility  coefficient, 0.001, reported in the sec- 
and row of Table 3. For group H firms, the total effect is 
0.022, that is, the sum of 0.001 and 0.021, the group H 
sales volatility coefficient shown  in the fifth  row of 
Table  3. 
The results suggest that the greater volatility of 
group H firms is not simply exogenous,  separate from 
the other observable forces affecting the firms; rather, 
the volatility  of group H firms seems to arise from their 
•  greater sensitivity to sales and cash volatilities.  In the 
specifications of Table 3, the significance of the group 
• 
H dummy for the constant term is greatly reduced. This 
result  i.s consistent with findings, reported in the next 
section, that increased leverage heightens the sensi- 
tivity of investment and employment to sales and cash 
flow shocks. 




Group H Dummy for  the Constant Term 
Group H dummy variable  0.033  0.058 
(3.8)  (4.4) 
R2  0.79  0.76 
Notes; Sample consists of 586 observations (firms). Means 
and standard deviations are calculated over the period 
1971-87. All regressions  include industry dummies (estimates 
not reported). Absolute t-statistics are shown in parentheses 
beneath coefficients. 
Explanation  of  variables; 
Volatility of  firms' investment  rates: standard deviations of 
investment-to-capital  ratios. 
Volatility of  firms' employment  growth rates: standard 
deviations of firms' employment  growth rates. 
Firm size: the firms' dollar value of  assets in 1979. 
Average  growth rates: mean investment  rates and mean 
employment  growth rates in the investment  and employment 
volatility equations, respectively. 
Sales volatility: standard deviation affirms' real sales—to—real 
capital or real sales—to—employment ratios in the investment 
and employment  volatility equations, respectively. 
Cash flow volatility: standard deviation of firms' real cash 
flow—to—real  capital or real cash flow—to—employment ratios 
in the investment  and employment  volatility equations, 
respectively. 
J  23This variable can be thought of  as the product of a group H dummy 
variable (unity if a firm is a group H member, zero otherwise)  times  ••  •__•  .•_•_ .•.  —-  _••  •  •.  the firms' sales volatilities. 
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The Marginal  Effects of Leverage on Investment and Employment  Volatilities: Robustness  Tests 
Dependent Variables 
Volatility of  Firms'  Volatility of  Firms' 
Investment  Rates  Employment  Growth Rates 
Explanatory  Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Firm size  —1.760  —1.741  —1.756  —2.202  —2.454  —2.312 
(3.0)  (3.0)  (3.0)  (2.1)  (2.3)  (2.2) 
Average  growth rate  0.813  0.798  0.802  0.925  0.964  0.916 
(17.2)  (16.8)  (16.9)  (10.3)  (10.9)  (10.3) 
Sales volatility  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
(1.3)  (2.0)  (1.4)  (2.1)  (2.3)  (2.2) 
Cash flow volatility  0.062  0.053  0.058  0.000  —0.001  —0.001 
(4.0)  (3.4)  (3.7)  (0.7)  (2.4)  (1.9) 
Group H Dummies  for the Constant Term and the Slope Coefficients 
Constant term  —0.018  —0.032  —0.017  0.012  0.029  0.013 
(0.2)  (3.9)  (1.8)  (0.8)  (2.2)  (0.9) 
Sales volatility  0.021  0.012  0.002  0.001 
(16.3)  (2.8)  (6.2)  (2.8) 
Cash flow volatility  0.486  0.231  0.005  0.003 
(16.2)  (2.4)  (6.4)  (3.3) 
R2  0.86  0.86  0.86  0.77  .  0.77  0.78 
Notes: Columns 1-3 present alternative specifications for  the investment  regression;  columns 4-6 present alternative  specifications for the 
employment  regression.  Variables and sample are defined in Table 2. Group H dummies are marginal constant terms or slope coefficients. 
All regressions include industry dummies (estimates not reported). Absolute t-statistics are shown in parentheses  beneath coefficients. 
Table 4 
The Cash Flow Sensitivities of Firms' Investment  and Employment  Demands: 
Variations across Leverage Groups 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory  Variables  Firm Investment  Firm Investment  Firm Employment  Growth  Firm Employment  Growth 
Current sales  1.1  1.5  32.4  29.8 
(16.7)  (18.1)  (40.7)  (35.4) 
Sales lagged one year  —1.0  —0.4  —24.5  —24.5 
(12.3)  (4.9)  (22.2)  (22.8) 
Sales lagged two years  0.2  —0.4  5.8  5.5 
(2.1)  (4.2)  (5.8)  (5.7) 
Sales lagged three years  —0.2  0.3  0.3  —1.1 
(3.0)  (4.0)  (0.4)  (1.7) 





Group H Dummy  on the  Cash Flow Slope  Coefficient 
Cash flow (group H effect)  45.2  20.0  37.8  18.0 
(29.0)  (10.1)  (13.1)  (5.6) 
R2  0.40  0.46  0.23  0.29 
Notes: All regressions are based on a sample of 586 firms over seventeen  years and include fixed-firm and year effects (not reported).  All 
estimated coefficients in the investment  and employment  equations have been multiplied by 100 and 10,000.  respectively.  Absolute 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses  beneath the estimated coefficients. The dependent and explanatory variables in the investment  and 
employment  equations  are deflated by the lagged capital stock (divided by the capital goods deflator) and employment  level, respectively. 
Sales and cash flows are divided by the GNP  deflator. 
*These regressions include marginal coefficients on cash flow estimated separately for  each industry (not reported).  These coefficients 
render a unique overall slope coefficient unidentifiable. 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  37 the more leveraged firms experience more investment 
and employment volatility and that the differences can- 
not be attributed to industry, firm-size, or firm-growth- 
rate effects. Furthermore, differences in standard devi- 
ations of investment and employment among group  H 
firms are strongly correlated with  differences in their 
sales and cash flow variability. Although it is not sur- 
prising that the firms with  high (low) sales and cash 
volatility  have tended toward high (low) investment and 
employment volatility as well, it is significant that this 
relationship is more pronounced for group H than for 
group L firms. 
The effects of leverage on the sensitivities of firms' 
Investment  and employment  demand to changes  in 
sales and cash flows 
This section  presents estimates of simple  models of 
firm investment and employment demands. The basic 
specifications relate capital expenditures and employ- 
ment growth to current and lagged values of sales and 
current cash flow. The main  result is that, when the 
specifications permit different coefficients on cash flow 
for the two groups, the highly leveraged firms exhibit 
significantly greater responsiveness of both investment 
Table 5 
and employment to cash flow. 
The  rest of the section presents regression estimates 
demonstrating that these findings are robust to the fol- 
lowing changes in model specification: (1) allowing the 
cash flow coefficient to vary systematically by industry, 
(2) splitting the highly leveraged group into two sub- 
groups, (3) using an alternative interest-coverage 
measure to identify the highly  leveraged group,  (4) 
making the cash flow coefficient a smooth function of 
firms' average leverage  ratios, and (5) replacing current 
cash flow by lagged  cash flow as an explanatory 
variable. 
The dependent variables  are real investment and 
changes in employment, and the explanatory variables 
are current real cash flow, current real sales, and three 
lags of real  sales.24 The estimation procedure  used 
removes from the data any part of a firm's investment 
or employment  demand that is correlated with changing 
24ln all the regressions,  the data for the investment  and employment 
equations are deflated by  the lagged real capital stock and 
employmenf,  respectively,  in order to obtain homoscedastic  residuals. 
Real sales and cash flows are obtained by deflating current dollar 
values by the GNP deflator.  Real investment  and capital stocks are 
obtained by deflating current dollar  values by the GNP capital goods 
deflator. 
The Cash Flow Sensitivities of Firms' Investment  and Employment  Demands: Variations across 
Leverage and Interest Coverage Groups 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory  Variables  Firm Investment  Firm Investment  Firm Employment  Growth  Firm Employment  Growth 
R2 
Current sales  1.1  1.4  32.4  32.4 
(15.7)  (21.6)  (40.6)  (40.7) 
Sales lagged one year  —0.9  —1.4  —24.5  —24.5 
(10.8)  (19.4)  (22.2)  (22.2) 
Sales lagged two years  0.1  0.6  5.8  5.8 
(1.7)  (6.7)  (5.8)  (5.8) 
Sales lagged three years  0.2  —0.4  0.3  0.3 
(2.8)  (4.8)  (0.4)  (0.4) 
Cash flow  6.9  5.9  —8.1  —8.1 
(11.2)  (9.3)  (4.4)  (4.4) 
Dummies for i-Il, H2, and Low Interest  Coverage  Groups on the Cash Flow Coefficients 
Cash flow (group Hi effect)  39.3  37.6 
(12.9)  (12.8) 
Cash flow (group H2 effect)  47.1  41.3 
(26.6)  (3.6) 
Cash flow (low interest 
coverage effect) 
Notes: All regressions are based on a sample of 586 firms over seventeen  years and include fixed-firm and year effects (not reported). All 
estimated coefficients in the investment  and employment  equations have been multiplied by 100 and 10,000,  respectively.  Absolute 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses  beneath the estimated coefficients. The dependent and expranatory  variables in the investment  and 
employment  equations are deflated by  the lagged capital stock (divided by the capital goods deflator) and employment  level, respectively. 
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characteristics of a firm such as size,  leverage,  or 
industry.25 
The first and third regressions reported in Table 4 
present the main results of  this section. The models for 
investment and employment are estimated using the 
full sample of 586 firms over seventeen  years. The 
cash flow coefficient is  allowed to vary between the 
high-leverage firms and the rest of the sample.26  The 
responsiveness  of the investment or employment 
growth rates to changes in cash flow for group L firms 
is given in the coefficient estimates of  the fourth row of 
the table. The responsiveness  of group H firms is given 
by the sum of the fourth and fifth rows in that table. 
The "group H effect" marginal coefficients of the fifth 
row indicate that the highly leveraged firms have 
greater sensitivities to cash flow. 
These results are quantitatively  as well as statis- 
tically  significant. The regression in the first column 
indicates that, when other variables are held constant, 
each extra dollar of cash flow (in 1982 dollars) gener- 
ates about 45 cents  more investment for group H than 
for group L firms. The regression in the third column 
indicates that, when other variables are held constant, 
each increase of 1  percentage point in the cash flow— 
to—employment  ratio causes the employment growth 
rate to rise four-tenths of 1  percent (37.8 divided by 
10,000) more at the highly leveraged firms than at the 
less leveraged firms. 
The second and fourth regressions reported  in 
Table  4 follow the same specification as the other two 
equations except that a marginal cash flow coefficient 
is estimated for each industry (estimates not reported) 
as well as for group H. The extra sensitivity that is 
found for group H  firms in the first and third regres- 
sions is still present, though somewhat reduced, under 
this specification. 
The regressions  reported in Table 5 examine the 
robustness  of these  results.  In the first  and  third 
regressions, group H is split in half into groups Hi and 
H2. Group Hi contains the most leveraged firms (the 
most indebted 10 percent of the sample). A marginal 
coefficient on cash flow is estimated for both of these 
2That is, in accordance with the standard convention  for  this type of 
regression analysis (panel data studies), annual and company 
dummies are included in all the models (coefficient estimates  not 
reported). The inclusion of  the annual dummies provides more 
accurate estimates of the relationships  between firms' rates of 
investment  and hiring and firms' sales and cash flows. Moreover, this 
approach ensures that the relationships  uncovered are, in fact, 
structural. The procedure does not reduce the macroeconomic 
significance of the results. 
aeThis is  accomplished by using all the observations on cash flow as 
one regressor  and using all the group H observations  on cash flow 
(With zeros for  the group L firms) as another regressor. 
subgroups. Somewhat  unexpectedly,  the estimates indi- 
cate that group H2 is slightly more sensitive to cash 
variations than group Hi. This evidence suggests that 
cash flow sensitivity is not a simple monotonic function 
of the degree of leverage. 
The second and fourth regressions presented  in 
Table 5 allow the cash flow coefficients to vary across 
firms grouped according to another measure of finan- 
cial distress. Here, firms are  ranked by their median 
interest coverage ratios over the 1971 to 1987 period; 
that is, firms are ranked by their average levels of inter- 
est coverage. The bottom 20 percent are separated 
from  the total and labeled the "low-coverage group." 
The  large estimates of the marginal coefficient on cash 
flow  for the  low-coverage firms suggest that  the 
increased sensitivities to cash flow variations found in 
Table 4 are robust to alternative measures of financial 
strain. 
Table 6 
The Cash Flow Sensitivities of Firms' 
Investment  and Employment  Demands: 
Variations Proportional to Firms' Leverage 
Ratios 
Current sales  1.5  31.3 
(24.1)  (39.2) 
Sales lagged one year  —1.0  —24.2 
(13.1)  (22.1) 
Sales lagged two years  0.2  5.8 
(2.0)  (5.8) 
Sales lagged three years  —0.1  0.3 
(1.8)  (0.5) 
Cash flow  —7.7  —12.0 
(9.8)  (6.3) 
Cash flow multiplied by 
Marginal Effect of Leverage 
on the Cash Flow  Coefficient 
139.5  99.1 
each firm's median  (33.1)  (15.2) 
debt-to-asset ratio 
R2  0.41  0.24 
Dependent Variables 
Firm 
Firm  Employment 
Explanatory  Variables  Investment  Growth 
Notes: All regressions are based on a sample of  586 firms 
over seventeen  years and include fixed-firm and year effects 
(not reported). All estimated coefficients in the investment  and 
employment  equations have been multiplied by  100 and 
10,000,  respectively.  Absolute t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses  beneath the estimated coefficients. The 
dependent and explanatory variables in the investment  and 
employment  equations are deflated by the lagged capital 
stock (divided by  the capital goods deflator) and employment 
level,  respectively.  Sales and cash flows are divided by the 
GNP deflator. 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  39 Table 7 
The Lagged Cash Flow SensitivitIes of Firms' Investment  and Employment  Demands: 
Variations  across Leverage Groups and Variations Proportional to Fms' Leverage Ratios 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory  Variables  Firm Investment  Firm Investment  Firm Employment  Growth  Firm Employment  Growth 
Current sales  2.3  2.3  32.9  32.6 
(41.4)  (42.1)  (42.4)  (42.0) 
Sales lagged one year  —2.9  —2.7  —25.7  —25.9 
(41.4)  (37.4)  (22.8)  (23.0) 
Sales lagged Iwo years  1.4  —1.4  7.5  7.5 
(17.2)  (16.9)  (7.5)  (7.7) 
Sales lagged three years  —0.5  —0.6  —1.5  —1.4 
(7.3)  (7.8)  (2.3)  (2.2) 
Cash flow lagged one year  10.2  4.7  4.0  —2.0 
(13.9)  (4.9)  (2.4)  (1.2) 
Group H Dummy  on the Lagged Cash Flow Coefficient 
and the Marginal Effect of Leverage on the  Lagged Cash Flow Coefficient 
Cash flow lagged one year  —1.5  11.5 
(group H effect)  (1.2)  (3.0) 
Cash flow fagged one year  27.2  36.9 
multiplied by  each fIrm's  (6.9)  (5.7) 
median debt-b-asset 
ratio 
R2  0.35  0.35  0.22  0.22 
Notes: All regressions are based on a sample of 586 firms over seventeen  years and include fixed-firm and year effects (not reported).  All 
estimated coefficients in the investmenf  and employment  equations have been multiplied by  100 and 10000, respectively.  Absolute 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses  beneath the estimated coefficients. The dependent and explanatory variables in the investment  end 
employment  equations  are deflated by the lagged capital stock (divided by the  capital goods deflator) and employment  level, respectively. 
Sales and cash flows are divided  by Ihe GNP deflator. 
Table 8 
Separate Estimates of Firm Investment  and Employment  Demands by Leverage Groups 
Dependent Variables 
Firm Investment  Firm Investment  Firm Emptoyment  Growth  Firm Employment  Growth 
Explanatory  Variables  (Group H)  (Group L)  (Group H)  (Group L) 
Current sales  3.3  0.6  68.1  25.0 
(12.1)  (8.4)  (26.8)  (32.2) 
Sales lagged one year  —1.3  —0.2  —51.2  —20.8 
(4.7)  (2.1)  (14.1)  (19.5) 
j  Sales lagged two years  —1.2  —0.3  8.2  5.9 
(3.5)  (3.4)  (2.8)  (5.9) 
Sales lagged three years  0.7  —0.1  0.3  —1.5 
(2.7)  (1.9)  (0.2)  (2.3) 
• 
Cash flow  23.6  8.7  3.9  —2.1 
(8.2)  (14.7)  (1.1)  (1.3) 
A2  -  0.70 
-  0.19  - -  -  0.43  -  0.17 
Notes: All regressions  are based on a sample of 586 firms over sevenbeen years and include fixed-firm and year effects (not reported).  All 
estimated coefficients in the investment  and employment  equations have been multiplied by 100 and 10.000,  respectively.  Absolute 
I-statistics are shown in parentheses  beneath the estimated coefficients. The dependent and explanabory  variables in the investmenf  and 
employment  equations are deflated by the  lagged capital stock (divided by  the capitat goods deflator) and employment  level, respectively. 
Sales and cash flows are divided b  the GNP  deflator. 
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sensitivities of firm investment  and employment to cash 
flow variations is presented in Table 6. Here, the coeffi- 
cients on cash flow are allowed to vary linearly with 
firms' median debt-to-asset ratios; that is, the explana- 
tory variable is the multiplicative product of firms' aver- 
age leverage  ratios and  their cash  flows.  This 
specification leads to an estimate of one cash flow— 
related coefficient for all firms, but the implied respon- 
siveness of each individual firm to its cash  flow equals 
the product of this coefficient estimate and that firm's 
debt-to-asset ratio. 
For example, in the investment equation, the esti- 
mated coefficient on the leverage/cash  flow interaction 
term is 139.5. This implies that, on average, a firm with 
a 50 percent debt-to-asset ratio spends about 70 cents 
of each extra dollar of cash flow on new investment; a 
firm with a 25 percent debt-to-asset ratio spends about 
35 cents. The interaction effects of cash flow and 
leverage on employment are similar. 
The  evidence presented so far considers the effects 
of leverage on the sensitivity of employment and 
investment to cash flow changes  in the same year. 
Table 7 presents estimates  of the effects of lagged 
cash flow on these variables. When the lagged cash 
flow coefficient is allowed to vary between groups, the 
group H coefficient is  significantly larger in the employ- 
ment equation but is insignificantly different from zero 
in the investment equation. When the lagged cash flow 
coefficient is specified as a linear function  of firms' 
debt-to-asset ratios,  however,  the  previous result that 
sensitivity to cash flow rises  with leverage is shown to 
hold for both dependent variables. 
Experimentation  reveals that leveraged firms' height- 
ened sensitivity to cash flow is robust to other  specifi- 
cation  changes as  well. When  the sensitivity of 
investment and employment to sales is also allowed to 
vary across groups, however,  some of the increased 
cash  flow sensitivity of group H firms is  apparently 
"transferred" to increased sensitivity to sales. 
This transferral of explanatory power from cash flow 
to sales is apparent in Table 8, which displays simple 
investment and employment demand models based on 
lagged sales and current cash flow. In these regres- 
sions, however, the equations are estimated separately 
for the group H and group L firms. In both the invest- 
ment and employment  models,  the more leveraged 
firms exhibit a stronger positive response to cash flow 
variations, but their heightened sensitivities to current 
sales fluctuations  are even  more dramatic.  Perhaps 
one cannot clearly distinguish the relative importance 
of leveraged firms' heightened sensitivities to sales or 
to cash flow shocks  because the two variables  are 
highly correlated. It is possible that some of  the height- 
ened sensitivity to cash flow might find its way to the 
sales coefficient because sales revenue is probably the 
most accurately measured part of  cash  flow, which also 
includes various noncash expenses such as deferred 
taxes and deferred interest. 
The regressions presented in this section  demon- 
strate that firms with higher  leverage vary their invest- 
ment and employment more in response to cash flow 
(and perhaps sales) variations than do fi(ms with less 
leverage. This conclusion appears robust to a variety 
of specifications and holds for a measure of leverage 
based on interest coverage, as well as one based on 
the debt-asset ratio. These heightened sensitivities are 
shown to be more than industry effects masquerading 
as leverage effects. 
ConclusIons 
The firm-level analysis presented in this article shows 
that an increase in leverage may be associated with 
increased cyclical variability of investment and employ- 
ment. The greater volatility of highly  leveraged firms 
appears to arise from a greater responsiveness  of 
investment and employment demands to fluctuations in 
internally generated funds. 
One way in which  monetary  policy can influence 
aggregate investment and employment is by affecting 
firms' sales and interest expenses and hence firms' 
cash  flows. The recent rise in corporate leverage may, 
therefore,  signal an increased sensitivity  of employ- 
ment and investment to monetary policy, at least 
among corporations that have substantially raised their 
leverage. 
It is conceivable that the microeconomic effects of 
leverage reported here may not hold as strongly in the 
aggregate. In particular, even if one highly  leveraged 
firm cuts back sharply on employment in response to a 
downturn in sales or cash flow,  perhaps a less 
leveraged firm will pick up some of  the slack; that is, an 
industry's output  might not be affected by the degree of 
indebtedness of individual firms. A sizable degree of 
such "canceling out" of the effects of leverage at the 
industry  level seems plausible, however, only in the 
medium and  long run. Therefore, when leverage 
increases are fairly widespread, the corporate sector is 
likely to become more volatile and more responsive to 
sales and cash flow fluctuations, including those that 
arise from interactions between the economy and mon- 
etary policy. 
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